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(26) 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE v. WHITING: A LAW STUDENT’S 
FREEWHEELING INQUIRY 
LAURA E. PLOEG* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Illegal immigration” is a phrase that elicits strong opinions from many 
people.1  Debate on the topic ranges from the blatantly racist to sympathy for 
the plight of immigrants, and less emotionally based arguments that fall in 
between.2  It is estimated that there are over ten million undocumented aliens in 
the United States.3  Most people agree that something must be done about 
illegal immigration; the question becomes what.4  In an attempt to stem the tide 
 
* Villanova University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013.  The National Law 
Review chose an earlier version of this Note as one of the winners of its Fall 2012 Law 
Student Writing Contest. 
1.  Cf. Anti-Immigration Groups, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Spring 2001) 
[hereinafter SPLC], http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-
issues/2001/spring/blood-on-the-border/anti-immigration-# (listing and briefly describing 
several anti-immigration groups). 
2.  See id. (describing anti-immigration groups); Racist Music, Neo-Paganism and 
Nationalism Drive Growth of Hate Movement, SPLC (Spring 2001), 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2001/spring/the-
year-in-hate (describing existence of racist and ethnic hate including ethnic nationalism); 
National Pro-Immigrant Groups, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCS., 
http://www.publiceye.org/research/directories/immig_grp_defend.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2011) (listing various pro-immigrant groups). 
3.  See MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN C. BAKER, OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010 1 (2011).  It is 
difficult to know how many undocumented aliens are residing in the United States, thus 
estimates are made by subtracting the number of documented aliens from the number of 
foreign-born residents based on information collected by the Census Bureau.  See id. at 1–2.  
For years between census collections, estimates are made by extrapolation based on recent 
immigration patterns.  See id. at 6–7.  Undocumented aliens who do not complete a Census 
form are not included in the estimate. 
4.  Cf. DREAM ACT PORTAL, http://dreamact.info/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012) 
(discussing one proposed reform to immigration law).  The Dream Act (“Act”) would have 
given legal immigration status to children who were brought into the country by their parents, 
so long as they completed certain education or military service requirements because the 
children were theoretically incapable of making the choice for themselves.  See id.  The Act, 
to the frustration of many, did not make it past the Senate.  See Elise Foley, DREAM Act Vote 
Fails in Senate, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2010, 11:31 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/18/dream-act-vote-senaten798631.html.  In the 
summer of 2013, President Obama initiated an administrative substitute for the Dream Act, 
generally referred to as “DACA” (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) which provides 
certain young undocumented aliens with temporary deferred action and work authorization.  
See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVICES, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgne
xtoid=f2ef2f19470f7310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=f2ef2f19470f731
0VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD. 
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of illegal immigration, some states have enacted their own immigration laws.5  
Additionally, many state laws that purport to regulate areas such as housing or 
employment are effectively immigration regulations.6  Arizona passed laws of 
this sort, one of which addresses employment of unauthorized aliens, thus 
targeting a primary incentive for immigration.7  This law was recently the 
subject of litigation in the United States Supreme Court.8 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court, in Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting,9 should have found that federal law pre-empts the Arizona law, and 
that the Court’s holding will have serious consequences.10  Section II of this 
Note provides an overview of Whiting, and the relevant state and federal 
statutes considered therein.11  Section III discusses principles of the pre-
emption doctrine relevant to Whiting.12  This discussion begins with an 
overview of the federal power to legislate in the area of immigration, and an 
introduction to the germane principles of pre-emption.13  The discussion then 
examines the progression of the pre-emption doctrine, including its application 
in the specific areas of immigration law and employment authorization.14  
Finally, Section IV addresses the practical concerns resulting from Whiting. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE v. WHITING 
 
In Whiting, the United States Supreme Court analyzed potential pre-
emption of Arizona law by two federal statutes, the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
 
5.  See generally NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, DEFICITS, LAWSUITS, DIMINISHED 
PUBLIC SAFETY: YOUR STATE CAN’T AFFORD S.B. 1070 (2010), available at 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2010/SB1070Report.pdf (highlighting 
proposed or discussed state laws). 
6.  See, e.g., Department of Justice Challenges Alabama Immigration Law, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/11-ag-993.html 
(noting Alabama law is “designed to affect virtually every aspect of an unauthorized 
immigrant’s daily life”).  The Alabama law regulates things such as housing, transportation, 
right to contract, schooling, and other areas.  See id.  Alabama and other states are regulating 
these areas with the specific aim of targeting undocumented aliens.  See id.  
7.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975–76 (2011) (discussing 
Arizona law that affects employment of unauthorized aliens). 
8.  See id. at 1977 (deciding whether federal law pre-empts Arizona law). 
9.  131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
10.  Cf. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 234 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing pre-
emption principles).  Implied pre-emption principles, applied traditionally, provide strong 
support for invalidation of the Arizona law.  See id.   
11.  For a discussion of statutes considered in Whiting and the court’s rationale for its 
holding, see infra notes 17–46 and accompanying text. 
12.  For a discussion of the pre-emption doctrine, see infra notes 47–173 and 
accompanying text. 
13.  For a discussion of the federal government’s power to legislate immigration and an 
introduction of pre-emption principles, see infra notes 47–73 and accompanying text. 
14.  For a discussion of the progression of pre-emption case law, including the 
application of pre-emption principles in immigration law and employment authorization, see 
infra notes 74–173 and accompanying text. 
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Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).15  This section summarizes the relevant state and 
federal laws, the Court’s reasoning, and its ultimate holdings on the pre-emption 
issue.16 
IRCA requires all employers to verify employment authorization for all 
new hires.17  Specifically, the law outlines the required verification procedure 
and imposes sanctions for knowingly hiring an unauthorized alien.18  IRCA 
also contains a pre-emption provision which states that, “[t]he provisions of this 
section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions 
(other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or 
recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”19  The language 
allowing state licensing laws—a saving clause—carves out a small class of state 
law from pre-emption.20 
IIRIRA authorized the creation of E-Verify as an “experimental 
complement[] to the I-9 process” of document review.21  E-verify is an 
electronic system for employers to verify employment authorization of 
workers.22  IIRIRA announces that use of E-Verify is voluntary and prohibits 
the Secretary of Homeland Security from mandating its use for anyone outside 
of the federal government.23  Use of E-Verify for employment authorization 
verification, however, creates a rebuttable presumption of compliance with 
IRCA.24 
Arizona law requires that all employers use E-Verify.25  The attorney 
general or county attorney is required to request information from the federal 
government regarding the immigration status of a worker upon complaint, by 
 
15.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974–75 (2011) 
(discussing and outlining relevant portions of IRCA and IIRIRA). 
16.  For further discussion of the applicable statutes and pre-emption case law, see infra 
notes 17–46 and accompanying text. 
17.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a), (b), (e)–(f) (2006) (explaining required procedure for 
employment authorization verification and sanctions for non-compliance).   
18.  See id. (describing compliance procedures and stating civil and criminal penalties).  
The employer is required to review documents of employment applicants that establish their 
work authorization and identification.  See § 1324(b).  Also, it states that it is a crime to “hire, 
or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien 
is an unauthorized alien.”  § 1324a(a)(1)(A).  Civil sanctions for knowingly hiring, recruiting, 
or referring unauthorized aliens for employment range from a minimum $250 fine for a first 
offense to a maximum $10,000 fine in the case of multiple previous violations.  See § 
1324a(e)(4)(A).  Criminal sanctions include a maximum $3,000 fine and six months 
imprisonment for a pattern of violations.  See § 1324a(f)(1). 
19.  § 1324a(h)(2). 
20.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977–78 (discussing saving clause and Arizona law). 
21.  See id. at 1975 (discussing E-Verify and other programs created by IIRIRA). 
22.  See Naomi Barrowclough, Note, E-Verify: Long-Awaited “Magic Bullet” or Weak 
Attempt to Substitute Technology for Comprehensive Reform?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 793 
(2010) (explaining E-Verify). 
23.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1975 (explaining limitation on Secretary’s authority to 
require use of E-Verify).  The Secretary of Homeland Security is only permitted to require the 
use of E-Verify by individuals or entities within the federal government.  See id. 
24.  See id. (explaining rebuttable presumption created by use of E-Verify). 
25.  See id. at 1976–77 (laying out Arizona law’s requirements). 
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any person, that a worker is unauthorized.26  Upon a determination that an 
employer has knowingly hired an unauthorized alien, the law imposes various 
sanctions ranging from mandatory termination of the employee, mandatory 
filing of quarterly reports for all new hires, and a ten-day suspension of the 
employer’s business license for a first time offense, to permanent revocation of 
all business licenses for a second offense.27 
Several business groups and civil rights organizations, led by the Chamber 
of Commerce (“Chamber”), challenged the Arizona law on several grounds.28  
First, the Chamber argued that the Arizona law is explicitly pre-empted because 
it is not a legitimate licensing law; it does not serve to grant licenses, but only to 
suspend or revoke them.29  The Court rejected this argument as having “no 
basis in law, fact, or logic.”30  The Court also refused to consider the 
 
26.  See id. at 1976 (explaining relevant portions of Arizona law).  Interestingly, the 
Arizona law prohibits state and local officials from making final determinations about work 
authorization on their own, yet there is no mechanism whereby they can obtain information 
regarding the work authorization of noncitizens.  See id.  The Arizona law directs state and 
local officials to obtain information regarding immigration status pursuant to Section 1373(c).  
See id.  Immigration status, however, is not the same thing as work authorization; many 
categories of noncitizens legally residing within the country are not authorized to work.  See 
generally Classes of Aliens Authorized to Accept Employment, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2011).  
Thus, the Arizona law explicitly prohibits, yet implicitly requires, state and local officers to 
make final determinations.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1976 (“The Arizona law expressly 
prohibits state, county, or local officials from attempting to ‘independently make a final 
determination on whether an alien is authorized to work in the United States.’” (quoting ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2010))).  The Arizona law also directs state courts to only 
consider the federal government’s determination of, presumably, immigration status.  See id.  
Thus, state judges, like state and local officers, are left to navigate federal immigration law.  
See id.  
27.  See id. (explaining sanctions imposed by Arizona law).  It should be noted that, 
because state courts will be hearing charges brought for alleged violations of Arizona law, the 
state courts will also be determining whether the employment of an unauthorized alien was 
done “knowingly,” which is a different determination than under federal law due to the 
mandatory use of E-Verify.  See id. at 1976–77 (acknowledging that state courts hear 
complaints for violations of Arizona law).  If an employer fails to use E-Verify, yet followed 
the I-9 procedure required by federal law, it would still not be able to effectively challenge a 
charge of knowingly hiring an unauthorized alien.  See id.  It could be argued that any lack of 
knowledge that a worker is unauthorized was due to the employer’s failure to use E-Verify as 
required by Arizona law.  See id.  This also means that actions taken which would provide a 
defense under federal law would be insufficient under Arizona law.  See id. (ignoring 
heightened standards under state law).   
28.  See Julie Myers Wood, Supreme Court Affirms a State Immigration Law—What it 
Means, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5686, 5687 (2011) (noting identity of plaintiffs in Whiting). 
29.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1979 (explaining and rejecting Chamber’s argument 
regarding licensing laws).  The Chamber’s argument seemingly asserted that a licensing law is 
more comprehensive than a law that merely prescribes licensing sanctions.  See id.  This may 
also indicate that Arizona’s law is different in substance and purpose than the ordinary state 
function of licensing and is actually an immigration regulation in disguise.  Cf. id. (finding 
Arizona law within scope of savings clause).  This raises the question of why a state may act 
in a way that is normally prohibited simply by calling its actions by a different name.  Cf. id. 
(finding Chamber’s argument without merit). 
30.  See id. at 1977–79 (considering whether Arizona statute is licensing law).  The 
Court noted that Arizona’s definition of “license” is nearly identical to the definition of that 
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Chamber’s argument that the saving clause should be read narrowly in light of 
the history of its enactment, stating that the plain text of IRCA does not compel 
the suggested reading.31 
The Chamber next argued that the Arizona licensing law is impliedly pre-
empted on field pre-emption grounds.32  In other words, state law is ousted 
from the field of law because federal legislation comprehensively occupies the 
same field.33  The Court rejected the Chamber’s argument, asserting that 
because the Arizona law falls within the saving clause, it cannot offend any 
congressional intention to oust state law.34 
The Chamber also argued that the Arizona law is pre-empted because it 
upsets the balance struck by Congress among competing goals of “deterring 
unauthorized alien employment, avoiding burdens on employers, protecting 
employee privacy, and guarding against employment discrimination.”35  The 
Court asserted that licensing is not a traditionally federal area of regulation, and 
 
term within the Administrative Procedure Act.  See id. at 1978.  It also found Arizona’s 
inclusion of “documents such as articles of incorporation, certificates of partnership, and 
grants of authority to foreign companies,” was acceptable.  Id.  Thus, the Court concluded 
that, “Arizona’s licensing law falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to 
leave to the States and therefore is not expressly preempted.”  Id. at 1981. 
31.  See id. at 1979 (explaining and rejecting Chamber’s argument for narrow reading 
of saving clause).  The Chamber argued that Congress’s concurrent repeal of the Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) and enactment of IRCA support a 
narrow reading.  See id.  Specifically, the Chamber argued that state licensing sanctions 
should only be available after a federal adjudication.  See id.  Prior to IRCA, AWPA 
prohibited hiring unauthorized workers and outlined adjudicatory procedures for violations.  
See id.  When Congress enacted IRCA and repealed AWPA, adjudications of employment of 
unauthorized workers for agricultural work, which can result in suspension or revocation of 
labor certification, rested on a prior finding of an IRCA violation for the first time.  See id.   
 The Court, however, found this to be merely evidence that Congress “eliminated that 
potential redundancy.”  Id.  Although the Chamber argued that the elimination of a 
redundancy is further evidence that Congress intended uniformity in the law, rather than 
separate laws for each state, the Court again reverted to the plain text of the statute and the 
fact that the Arizona law claims to rely on federal determinations.  See id. at 1979–80.  (“[I]t 
is worth recalling that the Arizona licensing law is based exclusively on the federal 
prohibition—a court reviewing a complaint under the Arizona law may ‘consider only the 
federal government’s determination’ with respect to ‘whether an employee is an unauthorized 
alien.’”  (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(H) (2010))).  The only federal 
determinations provided to the state, however, are those regarding immigration status as 
opposed to work authorization.  See id. at 1992 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
32.  See id. at 1981 (majority opinion) (noting Chamber’s field pre-emption argument).  
The Chamber argued that the Arizona law necessarily conflicted with federal law because 
Congress had intended its legislation to be exclusive.  See id. (citing Reply Brief for 
Petitioners at *1, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115), 
2010 WL 4803135, at *1). 
33.  See Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) 
(explaining field pre-emption). 
34.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981 (“Arizona’s procedures simply implement the 
sanctions that Congress expressly allowed Arizona to pursue through licensing laws.”). 
35.  Id. at 1983. 
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denied that state law would impede federal programs.36  The Court also 
downplayed the pressure placed on employers and the corresponding potential 
for discrimination.37  Finally, the Court stated that, “[i]mplied preemption 
analysis does not justify a ‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state 
statute is in tension with federal objectives,’” because “‘it is Congress rather 
than the courts that preempts state law.’”38 
Finally, the Court rejected the Chamber’s argument that IIRIRA impliedly 
pre-empts the Arizona law’s E-Verify mandate.39  The Court concluded that 
federal law “limits what the Secretary of Homeland Security may do—nothing 
more.”40  Sidestepping congressional intent, the Court instead pointed to 
President George W. Bush’s expression of support for the Arizona law.41  The 
Court did reference Congress’s objectives in developing E-Verify, but failed to 
 
36.  See id. (distinguishing from prior cases).  The Court distinguished all of the cases 
cited by the Chamber regarding state laws that upset the balance struck by federal law.  See id.  
The Court argued that all of these cases involved legislation of matters that are “uniquely 
federal.”  See id.  In this case, the Court explained, licensing laws are not a traditionally 
federal concern.  See id.  However, the Court failed to discuss that the Arizona law is a 
licensing sanction for immigration law violations and is intended to have clear effects on 
immigration and employment of noncitizens.  See generally id.  
37.  See id. at 1984 (rejecting argument that discrimination will increase from Arizona 
law).  Justice Breyer and the Chamber argued that businesses are likely to discriminate in their 
hiring practices rather than risk license suspension or revocation under the Arizona law.  See 
id.  The Court argued that such a result is unlikely because license suspension and revocation 
are sanctions only for knowing violations, and proclaimed that “[a]n employer acting in good 
faith need have no fear of the sanctions.”  Id.  The Court also asserted that the Arizona law 
will not displace IRCA’s anti-discrimination provisions.  See id.  However, Congress foresaw 
the potential for discrimination with the I-9 process alone, and thus contemporaneously 
prohibited discrimination in hiring practices based on national origin or citizenship status.  See 
Andrew P. Karabetsos, Immigration-Related Employment Discrimination Under IRCA, 82 
ILL. B.J. 32, 32 (1994) (explaining Congress’s purpose for prohibition of discrimination in 
IRCA).  Adding further verification requirements and further sanctions under state law can 
only increase the potential for discrimination.  See generally id. 
38.  Id. at 1985 (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
39.  See id. at 1985–86 (rejecting Chamber’s argument that Arizona law requiring E-
Verify use is pre-empted by federal law).  The Chamber did not challenge Arizona’s E-Verify 
mandate on express pre-emption grounds because IIRIRA does not contain a pre-emption 
provision.  See id. at 1985 (noting that IIRIRA “contains no language circumscribing state 
action”). 
40.  Id. 
41.  See id. (discussing Executive Order 13465).  President George W. Bush, in a 2008 
Executive Order, required all federal contractors to use E-Verify and cited the Arizona law as 
support for the legitimacy of the Order.  See id.  He explained, when attacked on the grounds 
that E-Verify could not be made mandatory for anyone outside of the federal government, that 
he was acting in the same permissible way as Arizona by requiring E-Verify use because 
IIRIRA only limits the authority of the Secretary of DHS to mandate E-Verify.  See id.  The 
Court did not discuss the significance of the fact that the Executive Order was also challenged, 
and that it was in this setting that the President spoke supportively of the Arizona law.  See 
generally id. (ignoring that Executive Order was challenged). 
6
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address its specific objectives for making use voluntary.42  Thus, focusing on 
the broader objectives of E-Verify, the Court found state law did not undermine 
legislative purposes.43 
In rejecting the Chamber’s argument that state E-Verify mandates would 
result in an unsustainable drain on federal resources, the Court relied on a 
statement by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).44  DHS expressed 
confidence that the E-Verify system could handle increased use resulting from 
Arizona’s mandate in addition to similar existing mandates, but did not address 
the specific issue of federal resources or the consequences of additional state 
mandates.45  In sum, the Court rejected all express and implied pre-emption 
arguments by the Chamber without undertaking a sincere analysis of implied 
pre-emption.46 
 
III. PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE AND IMPLIED PRE-EMPTION: ITS HISTORY, 
CURRENT CONTOURS, AND APPLICATION TO IMMIGRATION LAW 
 
This section provides an overview of the pre-emption doctrine; specifically 
principles of implied pre-emption.47  First is a discussion of the federal power 
to regulate immigration, followed by an overview of general pre-emption 
principles.48  Next is a glance at both the early and recent application of implied 
pre-emption principles in immigration law, particularly in the area of alien 
 
42.  See id. at 1986 (explaining objectives of creating E-Verify).  The Court stated that, 
“Congress’s objective in authorizing the development of E-Verify was to ensure reliability in 
employment authorization verification, combat counterfeiting of identity documents, and 
protect employee privacy.”  Id. 
43.  See id. (finding that Arizona law does not conflict with congressional objectives).  
The Court, after noting the purposes of creating E-Verify, proclaimed that “Arizona’s 
requirement that employers operating within its borders use E-Verify in no way obstructs 
achieving those aims.”  Id. 
44.  See id. (rejecting Chamber’s argument that nationwide E-Verify use would result in 
federal resource drains).  Also, the Court cited DHS for the opinion that “‘the E-Verify system 
can accommodate the increased use that the Arizona statute and existing similar laws would 
create.’”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at *34, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 
09-115), 2010 WL 3501180).  This says nothing about federal resources, nor does it predict 
potential results of state E-Verify mandates beyond those existing.  See generally id. 
45.  See id. (discussing statement made by DHS). 
46.  See id. at 1981–85 (acknowledging and rejecting Chamber’s implied pre-emption 
arguments).  The Court briefly considered the Chamber’s implied pre-emption arguments, 
citing sources such as the President and DHS as support for its conclusion.  See id.  The Court 
ended by stating that its analysis cannot be a “‘freewheeling judicial inquiry.’”  Id. (quoting 
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1995)). 
47.  For a discussion of the pre-emption doctrine, including implied pre-emption, see 
infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text. 
48.  For a discussion of federal power to regulate immigration, see infra notes 51–62 
and accompanying text.  Additionally, for a discussion of general pre-emption principles, see 
infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text. 
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employment.49  Finally, this section attempts to show that implied pre-emption 
principles dictate pre-emption of Arizona law.50 
 
A. Basis for Federal Power to Legislate in the Area of Immigration Law 
 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal law pre-empts 
conflicting state law so long as it is made pursuant to the Constitution.51  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress holds plenary power to 
regulate immigration.52  Although the Supreme Court has found different bases 
for the federal exercise of this power over time, the Court has most recently 
attributed this power to the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution.53  The 
Naturalization Clause states that Congress has the power to “establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”54 
As early as 1875, the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s power to 
legislate in the area of immigration, initially citing the Commerce Clause as the 
basis for such power.55  In several other cases, the Court has stated that the 
 
49.  For a discussion of implied pre-emption over time and the application of implied 
pre-emption principles to immigration law, including immigration law concerning 
employment of aliens, see infra notes 74–131 and accompanying text. 
50.  For a discussion of implied pre-emption principles dictating pre-emption of 
Arizona law, see infra notes 150–73 and accompanying text. 
51.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”) 
52.  See Gary Endelman & Cynthia Juarez Lange, State Immigration Legislation and 
the Preemption Doctrine, in 41st ANNUAL IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION INST. 123, 127 
(Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Cynthia Juarez Lange eds., 2008) (noting that Supreme Court has 
long recognized federal power to regulate immigration); see also Clare Huntington, The 
Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 795 (2008) 
(recognizing that for over 100 years, immigration law governing admission and removal has 
been accepted as virtually exclusive federal power). 
53.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983) (finding federal power to regulate 
immigration based upon Naturalization Clause).  The primary issue in Chadha involved the 
constitutionality of legislative vetoes.  See id. at 923.  In contrast to the way legislative vetoes 
were usually exercised—to override administrative regulations—the veto in this case would 
have overturned an administrative adjudication.  See id.   
The issue of federal power to regulate immigration was only raised as part of the Court’s 
response to the government’s assertion that Chadha’s claim was a non-justiciable political 
question.  See id. at 940.  In the course of rejecting that assertion, the Court stated that, “[t]he 
plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. I, §8, cl. 4 is not open to question.”  Id.  
Thus, because the basis of the federal power to regulate immigration was not a primary issue 
of the case, it is arguable that the Court did not thoroughly consider whether such power is in 
fact derived from the Naturalization Clause. Cf. id.  
54.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
55.  See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884) (declaring 
Congress has “the power to pass a law regulating immigration as a part of the commerce of 
this country with foreign nations . . . .”); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 
(1875) (finding federal power to regulate immigration as derivative of Commerce Clause 
powers).  In Henderson, the Court struck down a New York statute requiring a tax to be paid 
for each immigrant arriving in any New York port.  See Henderson, 92 U.S. at 260–61.  The 
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power is grounded in authority inherent in independence and sovereignty.56  It 
has also specifically linked the authority to inherent foreign affairs powers.57 
 
Court explained that regulation of navigation is included in the power to regulate foreign 
commerce because navigation is “the principal means by which foreign intercourse is 
effected.”  Id. at 270.  The Court further asserted that the power to regulate navigation and, 
more specifically, the “‘admission of vessels’” included the power to regulate “admission of 
their cargo or their passengers.”  Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 190 (1824)).  The 
Court also emphasized the influence on commerce by immigrants due to their labor and the 
wealth they bring with them.  See id.  Thus, the Court concluded that the state law was invalid 
for its encroachment upon the federal legislature’s power to regulate commerce.  See id.  The 
Court summed up its conclusion by stating: “As already indicated, the provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States, on which the principal reliance is placed to make void the 
statute of New York, is that which gives to Congress the power ‘to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations.’”  Id.  (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).  Prior to 1875—the year 
Henderson was decided—the federal government had mostly left the area of immigration law 
alone, thus states were able to pass their own legislation.  See generally Gerald L. Neuman, 
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 
(1993) (describing status of immigration law before 1875).  It makes sense that 1875 marked 
the beginning of the Court’s recognition of federal power to regulate immigration because that 
year also signaled the beginning of the federal government’s exercise of its power to regulate 
immigration.  See id. at 1896–99. 
56.  See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 
603–04 (1889) (finding federal power to regulate immigration grounded in inherent powers of 
sovereignty); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (finding power to regulate 
immigration as part of inherent power to conduct foreign relations).  The Court has concluded 
in various cases that power to regulate immigration is based on inherent powers of sovereignty 
or foreign affairs.  See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603–04.  In the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, the Court relied on and explained inherent powers of sovereignty: 
“Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation.  It 
is part of its independence.  If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to 
the control of another power.”  Id.  The Court further listed inherent powers of sovereignty, 
which included “[t]he powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel 
invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republic governments to the states, and admit 
subjects of other nations to citizenship.”  Id. at 604. 
In Chy Lung, the Court emphasized specifically the inherent sovereignty power to 
conduct foreign affairs, asserting that regulation of immigration is included within that power.  
See Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280.  To illustrate the risks of removing this power from the 
exclusive exercise of the federal government, the Court asserted that “[i]f it be otherwise, a 
single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.”  Id. at 
280.  Thus, in order to effectively manage foreign affairs, the federal government must also 
have exclusive control over immigration law.  Cf. id. (asserting that federal government has 
inherent power over all foreign affairs). 
57.  See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941) (finding federal power to 
regulate immigration as derivative of foreign affairs powers as evidenced by precedent and 
original intent); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (emphasizing and describing 
inherent powers of sovereignty); Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279–80 (finding federal power to 
regulate immigration as part of inherent foreign affairs powers).  In one of many such 
holdings throughout the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court noted that “the United States, in 
their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with 
powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the 
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.”  
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604.  Thus, for concerns that traditionally belong to the 
sovereign, especially in those matters necessary to the independence and safety of the entire 
country, the federal government necessarily has control.  Cf. id. (asserting that federal 
9
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Most recently, in INS v. Chadha,58 the Court stated that federal power to 
regulate immigration is grounded in the Naturalization Clause.59  In that case, 
noncitizen Chadha overstayed his visa and was subsequently subject to removal 
proceedings.60  Because he never sought naturalization, the Supreme Court 
arguably extended the Naturalization Clause beyond its plain text to matters of 
 
government has inherent foreign affairs power).  In Chy Lung, a California statute gave the 
state’s Commissioner of Immigration authority to determine if an arriving immigrant was: 
[L]unatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm, and is not 
accompanied by relatives who are able and willing to support him, or is 
likely to become a public charge, or has been a pauper in any other 
country, or is from sickness or disease (existing either at the time of 
sailing from the port of departure or at the time of his arrival in the State) 
a public charge, or likely soon to become so, or is a convicted criminal, 
or a lewd or debauched woman. 
Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 277.  If an arriving immigrant fell into one of these categories as 
determined by the Commissioner, the immigrant would not be permitted to leave the vessel on 
which she arrived unless the master, owner, or consignee gave a bond to ensure the immigrant 
would not create costs for the state.  See id.  Additionally, the Commissioner was allowed to 
charge the master, owner, or consignee of the vessel various other fees.  See id. at 277–78.  
The Court described the possible dangers of allowing states to regulate a subject, which has 
great potential for creating controversy with other nations, especially when a foreign nation’s 
citizens are found to fall into categories of “lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or 
infirm,” or other undesirable categorizations.  See id. at 277.  In considering such a possibility, 
the Court posed the question:  
[H]as the Constitution . . . done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the 
States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just 
reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit to the States the acts 
for which it is held responsible? 
Id. at 280.  The Court concluded that “[t]he Constitution of the United States is no such 
instrument.”  Id.  The Court also determined that the federal government must have the power 
to regulate immigration for “[i]f it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us 
in disastrous quarrels with other nations.”  Id.  In Hines, the Court found that a Pennsylvania 
alien registration law was pre-empted by a federal alien registration law.  Hines, 312 U.S. at 
62–63.  The Court relied on precedent and the Federalist papers: 
That the supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, 
including power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear by 
the Constitution was pointed out by the authors of The Federalist in 1787, and has 
since been given continuous recognition by this Court.  When the national 
government by treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the 
rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the 
supreme law of the land.  No state can add to or take from the force and effect of 
such treaty or statute . . . . 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Thus, the Court concluded that state law must be pre-empted because 
of “the supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including . . . 
immigration.”  Id. at 62. 
58.  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
59.  See id. at 940 (“The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 
4 is not open to question . . . .”) 
60.  See id. at 923–24 (explaining background facts leading up to review by Supreme 
Court).  Chadha came to the United States in 1966 with a nonimmigrant student visa, which 
expired in 1972.  See id. at 923.  In 1973, the INS commenced removal proceedings against 
Chadha.  See id. 
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immigration law in general.61  Regardless of the foundation attributed to federal 
power over immigration law, the Court has consistently recognized that 
Congress possesses such power.62 
 
B. General Principles of Pre-emption 
 
Federal legislation may pre-empt state legislation either expressly or 
impliedly.63  Implied pre-emption is further divided into two categories: field 
pre-emption and implied conflict pre-emption.64  These pre-emption principles 
apply to conflicts between state and federal law in all areas where federal power 
is legitimately exercised, including immigration law.65 
Express pre-emption occurs when Congress chooses to “pre-empt state law 
by so stating in express terms.”66  All other forms of pre-emption fall within the 
ambit of implied pre-emption.67  Field pre-emption occurs when congressional 
intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area is “inferred where the scheme 
of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.”68 
Implied conflict pre-emption can occur in two different ways.69  First, it 
can occur when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a 
physical impossibility.”70  Second, implied conflict pre-emption can occur 
when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”71 
 
61.  See id. at 923–24 (explaining Chadha’s immigration status leading up to review by 
Supreme Court).  The facts of the case do not indicate that Chadha ever sought to adjust his 
status to that of a lawful permanent resident, nor did he seek to extend the duration of his visa.  
See id.  During removal proceedings, Chadha sought to suspend deportation on grounds of 
extreme hardship that would result from removal, but there was no indication in the record 
that Chadha had any intention of applying for naturalization.  See id.   
62.  See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603–04 (asserting federal government has 
control over immigration matters); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884) (same); 
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875) (same); Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 
279–80 (same). 
63.  See 16A AM.JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 234 (2d ed. (2011) (discussing pre-
emption principles).  
64.  See id. (discussing pre-emption principles).  
65.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (announcing supremacy of federal law over state 
law); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940 (“The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 is not open to question . . . .”). 
66.  Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
67.  See generally Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption 
in the Supreme Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682, 684–85 (2011) (outlining various types of pre-
emption). 
68.  Automated Med., 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
69.  See id. (explaining both physical impossibility and obstacle versions of implied 
conflict pre-emption). 
70.  Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963)). 
71.  Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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Any argument that the Arizona law is expressly pre-empted would likely 
result in a battle over different definitions of the word “license.”72  Thus, 
because the strongest argument that the Arizona law is pre-empted by IRCA 
and IIRIRA is grounded in implied pre-emption, the following discussion will 
focus on this type of pre-emption.73 
 
C. Implied Pre-emption Cases in General 
 
The Supreme Court has developed and applied the pre-emption doctrine for 
over 150 years.74  Accordingly, a wealth of case law exists regarding the 
doctrine, within which implied conflict pre-emption plays a major role, despite 
the Whiting Court’s quick dismissal of any serious inquiry of this type.75  This 
 
72.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977–79 (2011) 
(considering intended meaning of “license” in IRCA’s saving clause in relation to scope of 
Arizona law).  The express pre-emption issue results in a battle of definitions, each of which 
provide varying levels of support for the Arizona law  Compare id., with Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1987–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for two different interpretations of word 
“license”).  The Court determined that Arizona’s law is a licensing law because it fits within 
the meaning of that term as defined by various sources.  See id. at 1977–78 (majority opinion).   
73.  See id. (considering intended meaning of “license”).  The Chamber’s express pre-
emption argument essentially asserts that Congress was only referring to a narrow class of 
licenses, as reflected by historical context.  See id. at 1979.  This argument, however, fails to 
explain why, if Congress had intended this narrow meaning of a word with many legal 
connotations, it did not make that clear in the text of the statute.  Cf. id. at 1988 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“But neither dictionary definitions nor the use of the word ‘license’ in an 
unrelated statute can demonstrate what scope Congress intended the word ‘licensing’ to have 
as it used that word in this federal statute.”).  
74.  See, e.g., Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. 397, 406–07 (1871) (explaining relation between 
state and federal law and supremacy of federal law in cases of conflict); see also Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 617–18 (1842) (asserting that state laws cannot intrude into area of 
law controlled by federal law).  In Tarble’s Case, the Court explained the relation between 
state and federal law, and the way pre-emption occurs: 
The two governments in each State stand in their respective spheres of action in the 
same independent relation to each other, except in one particular, that they would if 
their authority embraced distinct territories.  That particular consists in the 
supremacy of the authority of the United States when any conflict arises between 
the two governments. 
Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. at 406. 
75.  Compare Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (undertaking implied 
pre-emption analysis), with Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (expressing reluctance to inquire into 
congressional intent).  Referencing its longstanding practice of undertaking an analysis of 
conflicting state and federal laws to determine whether the state law is impliedly pre-empted, 
the Lohr Court, concluded that “our analysis of the scope of the statute’s pre-emption is 
guided by our oft-repeated comment . . . that ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).  In Whiting, by contrast, 
the Court refused to conduct what it called a “‘freewheeling judicial inquiry’” into the 
congressional intent or legislative purpose.  Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985.  Instead, the Whiting 
Court said it is Congress’s job to pre-empt state law.  See id.  The Court, however, did not 
explain how Congress could pre-empt state laws that it may not even be able to anticipate, 
especially decades into the future, if courts hesitate to examine legislative purpose.  See 
generally id. 
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section will discuss relevant case law to demonstrate that the Court has 
frequently been willing to employ a much more rigorous inquiry into implied 
pre-emption than that used by the Whiting Court.76 
 
1. Early Use of Implied Pre-emption 
 
The Supreme Court has long recognized implied pre-emption, developing 
and applying the doctrine over many years.77  One early case, Houston v. 
Moore78, clearly establishes pre-emption as a mechanism by which federal law 
trumps state law.79  Houston dealt with a Pennsylvania law that imposed 
penalties for failing to report when called for active military duty, and laid out a 
procedure for state adjudication.80  The state enacted this statutory scheme 
despite concurrent penalties and procedures prescribed by federal law.81  The 
Court found that the power to govern the militia, once it has been called forth, is 
an exclusively federal power.82  Moreover, the Court noted that—in areas 
where federal and state governments both have power to legislate—once 
Congress has spoken, state law must give way.83  Finally, the Court recognized 
that even if state legislation is not ousted from the area of law, if it is 
“practically inconsistent” with federal law, it “must yield to the supremacy of 
the laws of the United States.”84 
 
76.  For a further discussion of the Supreme Court’s application of implied pre-emption, 
see infra notes 77–123 and accompanying text. 
77.  See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (applying implied 
pre-emption principles); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000); Lohr, 518 U.S. 470; 
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. 
Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 
(1982); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a 
(2006), as recognized in Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011); Retail Clerks, 375 U.S. 96; 
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville 
Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915); S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439 
(1915); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820). 
78.  18 U.S. 1 (1820). 
79.  See id. at 33 (opinion of Johnson, J.) (“This Court can relieve him only upon the 
supposition that the State law under which he has been fined is inconsistent with some right 
secured to him, or secured to the United States, under the Constitution.”). 
80.  See id. at 2–3 (explaining Pennsylvania law). 
81.  See id. (explaining provisions of state law).  The Pennsylvania law imposed its own 
sanctions and procedure for adjudication of violations, on top of federal law governing the 
same issue.  See id.  
82.  See id. at 5 (explaining exclusively federal power to govern militia once called 
forth by national government). 
83.  See id. (explaining that exclusion of state law is necessary once federal legislation 
is passed).  This type of pre-emption is essentially field pre-emption, in that state law is ousted 
from an area that federal law dominates, even though state law could exist in that area absent 
federal legislation.  See Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 
(1985) (explaining various types of pre-emption).  
84.  See Houston, 18 U.S. at 5–6 (explaining that state law must give way where 
inconsistent with federal law).  Although the Court did not identify the type of pre-emption 
considered, the description is consistent with implied conflict pre-emption.  See Automated 
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2. Persisting Use of Implied Pre-emption in More Recent Years 
 
The Supreme Court has continued to rely on implied pre-emption, 
affirming that its validity has not faded over time.85  As recently as 1996, in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,86 the Court expressed strong support for implied pre-
emption principles and analysis of legislative purpose.87  The Court explained, 
“our analysis of the scope of the statute’s pre-emption is guided by our oft-
repeated comment . . . that ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”88  Elaborating further, the Court 
explained that, “any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must 
rest primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose.’”89 
Even more recently, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,90 the Court 
discussed pre-emption principles as they applied to a federal law similar in 
relevant respects to the federal laws considered in Whiting—IRCA and 
IIRIRA.91  First, the federal law in Geier resembled IRCA in that both 
 
Med., 471 U.S. at 713 (explaining various types of pre-emption).  Although the Court does not 
explain the meaning of “practically inconsistent,” it arguably encompasses the Supreme 
Court’s modern categories of “impossibility” and “obstacle” pre-emption, both of which 
create inconsistencies between state and federal law as a practical matter.  For a further 
discussion of implied pre-emption, see notes 79–125. 
85.  See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (undertaking 
rigorous implied pre-emption analysis). 
86.  518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
87.  See id. at 485–86 (expressing support for investigation of Congress’s purpose for 
legislation as part of pre-emption analysis).  The Court explained that legislative purpose can 
be discerned from the text of the statute, the “statutory framework,” the “structure and purpose 
of the statute as a whole,” and a “reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress 
intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and 
the law.”  Id. at 486.  The Whiting Court arguably referred to such an analysis when it 
expressed disapproval of “freewheeling judicial inquir[ies],”into Congress’s objectives.  See 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011). 
88.  Lohr, 418 U.S. at 485 (quoting Retail Clerks v. Shermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 
(1963) (alteration in original)).  The Lohr Court considered whether a federal statute regarding 
safety requirements for medical devices pre-empted state negligence law.  See id. at 474.  
After analyzing the legislative purpose and congressional intent, the Court’s findings led it to 
conclude that the state common law was not pre-empted.  See id. at 503.  This case also 
demonstrates that implied pre-emption analyses will not always lead to invalidation of state 
law.  See id. (finding state law not pre-empted). 
89.  Id. at 485–86 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 (1992)). 
90.  529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
91.  See id. at 867–68 (discussing federal regulation and pre-emption provision).  The 
pre-emption provision stated: 
“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this 
subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any 
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor 
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment[,] any safety standard applicable to the 
same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not 
identical to the Federal standard.   
14
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contained pre-emption provisions.92  Second, each contained a saving clause 
encompassing the state law at issue.93 
After finding that the state law fell within the saving clause of the federal 
law—meaning that the state law was not expressly pre-empted—the Geier 
Court continued its analysis to determine whether the state law conflicted with 
the federal law in a way that would implicate implied pre-emption.94  The Court 
concluded that, “the saving clause (like the express pre-emption provision) does 
not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”95  Similarly, 
later in the opinion, the Court again stressed that neither the existence of the 
pre-emption provision nor the saving clause “create[d] some kind of ‘special 
burden’ beyond that inherent in ordinary pre-emption principles—which 
‘special burden’ would specially disfavor pre-emption here.”96 
Throughout its analysis, the Geier Court expressed strong support for pre-
emption of state law where it conflicts with the operation or objectives of 
federal law, despite the existence of a saving clause.97  In one such statement of 
support, the Court declared that it “has repeatedly ‘decline[d] to give broad 
effect to saving clauses,’” if doing so would upset the balance struck by federal 
law.98  Later, the Court queried why Congress would have expected bypass of 
ordinary pre-emption principles despite actual conflict between federal 
objectives and state law.99  The Court concluded that Congress would not have 
intended that result.100 
 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988)).  A separate provision 
contained a saving clause, which stated, “‘[c]ompliance with’ a federal safety standard ‘does 
not exempt any person from any liability under common law.’”  Id. at 868 (alteration in 
original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (reapealed 1994)). 
92.  See id. at 865 (noting pre-emption provision of federal statute). 
93.  See id. at 868 (finding that state law fell within saving clause).  The Court 
determined that the combination of the text of the pre-emption provision, which allowed for a 
“narrow reading that excludes common-law actions,” combined with the existence of the 
saving clause, supported the inference that common law tort actions were not explicitly pre-
empted.  See id.  The Court concluded that, “the pre-emption clause must be so read.”  Id. 
94.  See id. at 869 (discussing whether saving clause affects implied pre-emption 
inquiry).  The Court considered the possibility that, although the pre-emption provision sought 
to ensure that state law was not automatically pre-empted, it was not intended to foreclose the 
possibility that a state law that actually conflicts with federal law will be upheld.  See id. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. at 870. 
97.  See id. at 869–72 (discussing congressional intent as limitation on effect of saving 
clause).  The Court argued that it would not make sense for the saving clause to preserve all 
state law tort actions despite their potential to undermine federal objectives.  See id. at 870.  
For example, the Court explained that the pre-emption provision itself was meant to “subject 
the industry to a single, uniform set of federal safety standards,” which would be undermined 
if conflicting state law was upheld.  See id. at 871. 
98.  Id. at 870 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 
106–07 (2000)). 
99.  See id. at 871 (“Why, in any event, would Congress not have wanted ordinary pre-
emption principles to apply where an actual conflict with a federal objective is at stake?”). 
100.  See id. at 872 (noting that disposal of ordinary pre-emption analysis due to 
existence of saving clause “would take from those who would enforce a federal law the very 
15
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The Court asserted that there is not a legal, but merely a terminological, 
difference “between ‘conflicts’ that prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of a 
federal objective and ‘conflicts’ that make it ‘impossible’ for private parties to 
comply with both state and federal law.”101  Thus, the Court concluded that 
state laws creating either type of conflict are invalid.102  The Geier Court 
asserted that this has been the Court’s practice and that it “has thus refused to 
read general ‘saving’ provisions to tolerate actual conflict both in cases 
involving impossibility and in ‘frustration-of-purpose’ cases.”103 
The Geier dissent attacked the majority with language similar to that used 
by the Whiting majority, claiming that analysis of “frustration-of-purpose” pre-
emption involved an unacceptable “freewheeling judicial inquiry.”104  The 
Geier dissent—like the Whiting majority—based its unwillingness to undertake 
such an inquiry on the idea that “‘it is Congress rather than the courts that 
preempts state law.’”105  The Geier majority responded to the dissent’s attack 
by commenting that pre-emption principles are difficult enough to apply 
without further complicating them by drawing new distinctions, as the dissent 
would have done.106  Specifically, it voiced concern that such an approach 
would create “legal uncertainty” and associated issues.107 
The federal law in Geier, which applied to airbag installation, is also useful 
 
ability to achieve the law’s congressionally mandated objectives that the Constitution, through 
the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles, seeks to protect”). 
101.  Id. at 873. 
102.  See id. (concluding both types of implied pre-emption are equally relevant).  The 
Court explained that state laws either creating impossibility or undermining federal objectives 
“are ‘nullified’ by the Supremacy Clause and it has [been] assumed that Congress would not 
want either kind of conflict.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
103.  Id. at 874 (citations omitted). 
104.  Compare id. at 906 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating narrower test for conflict 
pre-emption), with Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) 
(requiring high threshold to be met for frustration-of-purpose pre-emption). 
105.  Compare Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1985 (2011) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes 
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992)), with Geier, 529 U.S. at 906 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“‘[I]t is Congress [and federal agencies,] rather than the courts[,] that pre-emp[t] state 
law.’”). 
106.  See Geier, 529 U.S. at 873 (responding to dissent’s call for imposition of special 
burden on party claiming conflict pre-emption where federal statute contains both pre-emption 
and saving clauses).  The Court argued that the dissent’s approach of imposing a strong 
presumption against pre-emption—as opposed to applying ordinary pre-emption principles—
where a state law is found to be within the saving clause of a federal law, is undesirable.  See 
id. at 873–74.  The Court argued that “[a] ‘special burden’ would also promise practical 
difficulty by further complicating well-established pre-emption principles that are already 
difficult to apply.”  Id. at 873.  The Court noted the various types of pre-emption to further 
illustrate how a “special burden” would complicate an already confusing doctrine.  Id.  The 
Court also noted that there are not clear lines between the two categories of implied pre-
emption, but rather that they “often shade, one into the other.”  Id. at 874. 
107.  See id. at 874 (expressing additional concerns about dissent’s approach).  The 
Court asserted that the dissent’s “special burden” approach would result in legal uncertainty 
and “its inevitable systemwide costs (e.g., conflicts, delay, and expense).”  Id.  Further, it 
speculated that the dissent’s approach stemmed more from its dislike of implied pre-emption 
analysis than sound reasoning. See id. 
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for considering IIRIRA, the other federal law at issue in Whiting.108  In Geier, 
federal law required auto manufacturers to equip their cars with “passive 
restraints,” which included airbags.109  But the law did not specifically mandate 
airbags for several reasons, including safety concerns.110  It also did not 
prohibit installation of airbags on all cars, but left the choice to the 
manufacturer and provided them incentives for airbag installation.111  The 
federal law also sought to gradually phase-in passive restraints, largely to allow 
for technological development and increased safety of airbags.112  The Court 
held that state negligence law, which created liability for failure to install 
airbags, was pre-empted by federal law.113  It rested its conclusion on implied 
conflict pre-emption, asserting that state law upset the balance struck by federal 
law.114 
 
108.  Compare Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1975 (describing IIRIRA), with Geier, 529 U.S. at 
877–79 (detailing federal law regarding airbag installation and phase-in scheme). 
109.  See Geier, 529 U.S. at 878 (describing passive restraint mechanisms as including 
“airbags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies”). 
110.  See id. at 877–79 (explaining balance struck by federal law).  The Court explained 
that the Department of Transportation (DOT) considered much evidence when making 
decisions about regulations.  Id. at 877.  For example, it was shown that airbags alone could 
not make up for the safety benefits of a buckled seatbelt, and that airbags posed their own 
dangers.  See id.  Also, airbags were much more expensive than seatbelts and other passive 
restraints, which would increase the price of vehicles by $320, not including replacement 
costs after airbags are deployed.  See id. at 878. 
111.  See id. at 879 (explaining lack of ceiling for any particular safety device and 
detailing DOT’s incentive program for airbag installation).  The federal law gave car 
manufacturers credit for 1.5 cars with passive restraints for each 1 car installed with airbags.  
Id.  The DOT did not worry that this would result in over-reliance on airbags and, in turn, 
neglect of other passive restraints it sought because of the “likelihood that manufacturers 
would install, not too many airbags too quickly, but too few or none at all[.]”  Id. at 880. 
112.  See id. at 879 (describing phase-in process and need for development).  The 
phase-in process began with a requirement that ten percent of cars be equipped with passive 
restraints, increasing over time until passive restraints would be required for all cars.  See id.  
The Court determined that the phase-in system was meant to “allow more time for 
manufacturers to develop airbags or other, better, safer passive restraint systems.  It would 
help develop information about the comparative effectiveness of different systems . . . .”  Id. 
113.  See id. at 881 (holding that state law is pre-empted as obstacle to federal 
objectives). 
114.  See id. at 864–65 (explaining grounds for holding).  The Court summed up the 
reasoning leading to its holding: 
In effect, petitioners’ tort action depends upon its claim that manufacturers had a 
duty to install an airbag when they manufactured the 1987 Honda Accord.  Such a 
state law—i.e., a rule of state tort law imposing such a duty—by its terms would 
have required manufacturers of all similar cars to install airbags rather than other 
passive restraint systems, such as automatic belts or passive interiors.  It thereby 
would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal 
regulation sought. . . .  It thereby also would have stood as an obstacle to the gradual 
passive restraint phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed. . . .  
Because the rule of law for which petitioners contend would have stood “as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of” the important means-related 
federal objectives that we have just discussed, it is pre-empted.  
Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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IIRIRA is similar to the federal law in Geier in that it does not mandate an 
employer’s use of E-Verify.115  Furthermore, like the federal law incentive in 
Geier for the installation of airbags, IIRIRA provides employers who use E-
Verify with a rebuttable presumption of compliance with IRCA.116  The federal 
law in Geier mandated installation of safety devices, but left open the choice of 
installing seatbelts or going a step further by installing airbags.117  Similarly, 
federal immigration law mandates employment verification, but leaves open the 
decision of whether to use E-Verify in addition to I-9s (document 
inspection).118  Furthermore, the state law in each case sought to mandate the 
use of something voluntary under federal law that required further development 
to ensure it functioned properly.119  Finally, similar to the phasing-in of passive 
restraints in Geier, E-Verify is a pilot program.120 
Although the federal law in Geier contained an express pre-emption 
provision and IIRIRA does not, the Geier Court found that these portions of the 
law did not answer the pre-emption question and, thus, employed ordinary pre-
emption principles.121  Hence, there should have been no difference between 
the principles used to assess potential pre-emption in Whiting and Geier.122  
 
115.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011) (explaining 
relevant portions of IIRIRA); see also id. at 1996 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (highlighting various 
provisions of IIRIRA related to E-Verify bearing titles which include word “voluntary”).  The 
federal statute prohibited the Secretary of Homeland Security from requiring anyone outside 
of the federal government to use E-Verify.  See id. at 1975 (majority opinion).  Nevertheless, 
it created a rebuttable presumption of compliance with IRCA for anyone who used E-Verify 
to verify the employment authorization of an employee.  Id.   
116.  Compare id. at 1975 (explaining that employer who uses E-Verify may use that as 
rebuttable presumption against violation of IRCA), with Geier, 529 U.S. at 879 (noting that 
voluntary installation of airbags resulted in extra credit given to manufacturer under federal 
law). 
117.  See Geier, 529 U.S. at 878 (explaining that federal law set “performance 
requirement for passive restraint devices and allow[ed] manufacturers to choose among 
different passive restraint mechanisms . . . .”). 
118.  See Barrowclough, supra note 22, at 796–97 (explaining that use of E-Verify is 
voluntary and does not relieve employer of also completing I-9 forms, but creates rebuttable 
presumption of compliance with federal law). 
119.  Compare Geier, 529 U.S. at 879 (discussing DOT’s decision not to require 
airbags due to concerns about their safety), with Rachel Feller, Comment, Pre-empting State 
E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Arizona’s Improper Legislation in the Field of 
“Immigration-Related Employment Practices”, 84 WASH. L. REV. 289, 300–01 (2009) 
(discussing various flaws of E-Verify leading to inaccurate results). 
120.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1996 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that E-Verify 
is pilot program and voluntary in nature). 
121.  See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (noting that state law fell within saving clause but 
finding that ordinary pre-emption principles still applied). 
122.  Compare Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (finding federal law does not prevent states 
from mandating E-Verify), with Geier, 529 U.S. at 881 (discussing conflict between state law 
and federal law).  The Court in Geier found that state law requiring across the board 
installation of airbags conflicted with federal law requiring only ten percent of cars to have 
passive restraints, among which airbags were just one choice.  See Geier, 529 U.S. at 881.  
The Geier Court also found that the state law would undermine the phasing-in scheme created 
by federal law.  See id.  In Whiting, the Court concluded that federal law only limited the 
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Application of the implied pre-emption principles employed in Geier dictates 
that Arizona law is pre-empted.123 
 
D. Implied Conflict Pre-emption Cases in the                                            
Specific Area of Immigration Law 
 
The Supreme Court has made no exception for the application of pre-
emption principles in the specific area of immigration law.124  In Hines v. 
Davidowitz,125 a Pennsylvania law imposed certain registration requirements 
and corresponding sanctions on immigrants for violations that did not parallel 
co-existing federal law.126  In undertaking an implied pre-emption analysis, the 
Court explained that, “states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of 
Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or 
enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.”127  Additionally, the Court 
explained that its task involved determining whether state law stood as an 
obstacle to the purposes and objectives of federal law.128 
Rather than limit its application of implied pre-emption principles due to 
the subject matter, the Court emphasized the exigency of such an analysis in the 
area of immigration law.129  Specifically, the Court asserted that, in making a 
determination, “it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which affects 
international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has 
been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national 
authority.”130  Thus, ordinary pre-emption principles are fully applicable to 
 
Secretary of Homeland Security’s ability to mandate E-Verify.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 
1985.  The Court reached this conclusion despite numerous sections and subsections of 
IIRIRA regarding E-Verify containing the word “voluntary,” its requirement that the 
Secretary widely publicize the voluntary nature of E-Verify, E-Verify’s pilot program status, 
and reliability concerns with E-Verify.  See id. at 1996 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
123.   Cf. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1990–92 (asserting majority’s holding is incorrect and 
that Congress intended to forbid activity allowed by Arizona act). 
124.  See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (evaluating whether 
state alien registration law is impliedly pre-empted by federal alien registration law imposing 
different requirements and sanctions).  The Court specifically endorsed field pre-emption and 
various types of conflict pre-emption as appropriate grounds for invalidating state laws 
regulating immigration.  See id.  
125.  312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
126.  See id. at 59–61 (explaining relevant details of state and federal laws).  The 
Pennsylvania law at issue required all aliens eighteen and older to register with the 
Department of Labor and Industry, while the federal act required a single registration of aliens 
fourteen and older.  See id. 
127.  Id. at 66–67. 
128.  See id. (discussing implied conflict pre-emption).  The Court specifically stated 
that its task was to “determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, 
Pennsylvania’s law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”  See id. 
129.  See id. at 67–68 (emphasizing significance of issue and its potential impact on 
foreign relations). 
130.  Id. at 68. 
19
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immigration law.131 
 
E. Pre-emption of State Laws Regulating Employment of Noncitizens—From 
DeCanas v. Bica to Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 
 
Analysis of Whiting is not complete without mentioning DeCanas v. 
Bica,132 the Supreme Court case most analogous to Whiting because it also 
dealt with the specific issue of pre-emption in the context of a state law 
addressing the employment of noncitizens.133  This section gives a brief 
overview of DeCanas, and explains the differences between DeCanas and 
Whiting.134 
 
1. DeCanas v. Bica and INA: A Brief Explanation 
 
The federal law addressed in DeCanas was the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).135  IRCA was passed ten years after DeCanas, thus 
replacing INA as the relevant federal statute in Whiting.136  IRCA developed a 
comprehensive legislative scheme for employment authorization 
verification.137  INA, by contrast, did not explicitly deal with employment of 
noncitizens.138  The DeCanas Court found that California law was not 
 
131.  See id. at 66–67 (“And where the federal government . . . has enacted a complete 
scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for registration of aliens, states 
cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict with or interfere with, curtail or 
complement, the federal law . . . .”). 
132.  424 U.S. 351 (1976), superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006), as 
recognized in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
133.  See id. at 352–53 (explaining that issue is whether California law regulating 
employment of unauthorized aliens is pre-empted).  The California statute stated that, “[n]o 
employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the 
United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”  
Id. at 352 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(c) (1971) (repealed 1988)).  The Court considered 
whether the statute was pre-empted under either field pre-emption or implied conflict pre-
emption principles.  See id. at 352–53. 
134.  See infra notes 135–49 for a further discussion of DeCanas and its comparison to 
the Court’s decision in Whiting. 
135.  See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 353 (noting relevant federal statute is INA). 
136.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973–74 (2011) 
(explaining history leading up to enactment of IRCA).  The Court explained that IRCA 
explicitly dealt with employment of aliens, as opposed to the INA, which did not.  See id.  
Thus, the enactment of IRCA rendered DeCanas moot by undermining much of its reasoning.  
See id. at 1975. 
137.  See id. at 1974–75 (explaining IRCA’s system for employment authorization 
verification).  In short, IRCA made it a crime to knowingly hire an unauthorized alien, 
established I-9 form method of verification, imposed civil and criminal sanctions for 
violations, and created a system for judicial resolution of violations.  See id. 
138.  See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357–58 (finding no indication that Congress intended to 
oust state law regulating employment of aliens).  The Court noted that neither the federal 
statute’s language nor the legislative history indicated that Congress intended to oust state 
law.  See id.  It appeared as though the federal law simply left this area untouched, its central 
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impliedly pre-empted by INA under field pre-emption for three reasons.139  
First, states have traditionally held broad police powers to regulate employment 
in order to protect workers.140  Second, an exercise of this police power “must 
give way to paramount federal legislation.”141  Third, no paramount federal 
legislation existed because Congress had shown no more than a “peripheral 
concern with employment of illegal entrants.”142 
Next, the DeCanas Court considered whether the state law was pre-empted 
on implied conflict pre-emption grounds.143  The Court, however, found that 
the record provided by the lower court was insufficient to determine whether 
the California law created an obstacle to federal objectives.144  Thus, the Court 
 
concern being “the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent 
treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.”  Id. at 359. 
139.  See id. at 356 (finding state law not pre-empted).  The Court announced its 
holding by explaining that it could not “conclude that pre-emption is required either because 
‘the nature of the . . . subject matter (regulation of employment of illegal aliens) permits no 
other conclusion,’ or because ‘Congress has unmistakably so ordained’ that result.” Id. 
(quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)). 
140.  See id. at 356–57 (explaining traditional police power of states in area of 
employment).  The Court provided examples of the states’ police power over employment: 
“[c]hild labor laws, minimum and other wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and 
safety, and workmen’s compensation laws . . . .”  Id. at 356.  The Court concluded that 
regulation of an unauthorized aliens’ employment is “certainly within the mainstream of such 
police power regulation.”  Id.  
In opposition to the Court’s reasoning, a few important points deserve consideration.  
First, the federal government, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
regulates occupational health and safety.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–677 (1970).  Also, under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) the federal government regulates the minimum wage for 
any employee who, in any workweek, “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods 
for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce,” which covers most employment nationwide.  See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) 
(2012).  The federal government also regulates various other aspects of employment 
previously left to the states.  See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
1144(a) (2006) (stating that ERISA supersedes any State laws that relate to employee benefit 
plans as defined in statute).  
141.  DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357. 
142.  See id. at 360–61 (noting Congress expressed limited concern regarding 
employment of unauthorized aliens).  The Court explained that Congress had only expressed 
“peripheral concern” regarding employment of unauthorized aliens by explicitly excluding it 
from a provision criminalizing harboring of undocumented aliens.  See id. at 360.  In other 
words, Congress made certain not to unintentionally criminalize employment of unauthorized 
aliens resulting from misguided statutory interpretations that might consider employment to 
be harboring.  See id.  This, the Court argued, only displayed a “peripheral concern,” which is 
not sufficient to oust state legislation.  See id. at 360–61. 
143.  See id. at 363 (introducing issue of obstacle pre-emption).  The Court explained 
“[t]here remains the question whether, although the INA contemplates some room for state 
legislation, [the California law] is nevertheless unconstitutional because it ‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ 
in enacting the INA.”  Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
144.  See id. (finding record from lower court insufficient on issue of obstacle pre-
emption because lower court had not reached that question).  The Court of Appeals found that 
the state law was pre-empted on field pre-emption grounds, and thus had not reached the 
question of obstacle pre-emption.  See id.  Thus, the information required to determine the 
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concluded that the state law was not pre-empted, based solely on its field pre-
emption analysis.145 
 
2. Differences Between Whiting and DeCanas 
 
Despite dealing with pre-emption of state law regarding employment of 
noncitizens, DeCanas is not controlling because of the subsequent enactment of 
IRCA.146  Also, DeCanas differed from Whiting in that the INA contained no 
pre-emption provision or saving clause.147  Finally, the DeCanas Court did not 
undertake an implied conflict pre-emption analysis because the record was 
insufficient.148  Significantly, however, the DeCanas Court acknowledged 
implied pre-emption as a legitimate category of pre-emption.149 
 
F. What Was Congress’s Intent for IRCA and IIRIRA? 
 
The text of IRCA and IIRIRA necessitate pre-emption of Arizona law.150  
IRCA establishes a detailed scheme regarding admission of immigrants and 
nonimmigrants, and employment eligibility for each category of noncitizen.151  
It also sets out a detailed scheme for enforcing its employment authorization 
requirements.152  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is authorized to 
 
issue of obstacle pre-emption was lacking in the record provided to the Supreme Court.  See 
id. 
145.  See id. at 365 (reversing lower court decision).  The Court based its decision 
solely on its field pre-emption analysis, explaining that “[i]t suffices that this Court decide at 
this time that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that Congress in the INA precluded any 
state authority to regulate the employment of illegal aliens.”  Id.  
146.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974–75 (2011) 
(summarizing DeCanas and noting subsequent enactment of IRCA). 
147.  See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 (noting lack of intent to preclude state regulation 
either from wording of federal law or legislative history). 
148.  See id. at 363 (finding record from lower court inadequate on issue of obstacle 
pre-emption because appellate court had not reached that question). 
149.  See id. (noting remaining question of implied pre-emption).  The Court 
acknowledged that implied pre-emption was a possibility, but was unable to undertake such an 
analysis due to an inadequate lower court record.  See id. 
150.  For a discussion of why the Arizona law is necessarily pre-empted, see infra notes 
151–73. 
151.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012) (listing nonimmigrant categories of admission 
and corresponding information); see also Classes of Aliens Authorized to Accept 
Employment, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2011) (outlining work authorization for various 
nonimmigrant categories).  Nonimmigrant categories are admitted for varying lengths of time 
with varying eligibility for work.  See § 274a.12 (a)(19)–(20).  Employers of those in some of 
the eligible categories must receive certification from the Department of Labor before 
employing a noncitizen.  See § 1182 (a)(5)(A).  Some authorized workers are only permitted 
to work for the sponsoring employer.  See § 274a.12 (b). 
152.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (announcing mandatory employment authorization 
verification process and sanctions for non-compliance). 
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bring charges against employers who violate the requirements of federal law.153  
IRCA leaves to the states only the power to impose licensing sanctions.154  
Because ICE is given the power to bring charges for violations, the text allows 
states to impose licensing sanctions only in response to final determinations 
resulting from charges initially brought by ICE.155 
Mandating use of E-Verify directly conflicts with the text of IIRIRA.156  
IIRIRA makes use of E-Verify voluntary, as explicitly noted by several 
headings and subheadings of the relevant provisions.157  IIRIRA also instructs 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to “widely publicize” the fact that 
participation is voluntary, and prohibits the Secretary from mandating its use for 
anyone outside of the federal government.158 
Aside from the textual difficulties with finding that the Arizona law is not 
pre-empted, the state law also creates an obstacle to federal legislative 
purposes.159  Courts have discerned four primary purposes that Congress 
intended when it enacted the IRCA.160  First, stemming illegal immigration;161 
 
153.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011) (noting 
ICE’s authority to bring charges against violators).  Under Section 1324(a), the Attorney 
General is required to designate an entity that will bring charges against employers who 
violate the federal law’s employment authorization verification requirements.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1324(a).  ICE is the entity selected by the Attorney General to bring charges.  See Whiting, 
131 S. Ct. at 1974. 
154.  See § 1324a(h)(2) (announcing pre-emption of state and local law which would 
impose civil or criminal sanctions “other than through licensing and similar laws”). 
155.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 2004 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (asserting that state 
licensing sanctions were intended by Congress to follow final determination of charges 
brought by ICE).  Justice Sotomayor argued the saving clause should not be read to allow 
states to determine whether employer violations of IRCA have occurred because Congress has 
established a “specialized federal procedure” for judicial resolution of such violations.  See id.  
Justice Sotomayor also noted that states lack access to the necessary information to make such 
determinations, and considered that to be evidence that Congress did not intend for states to 
adjudicate IRCA violations.  See id. at 2003. 
156.  For a further discussion on why mandating the use of E-Verify is in conflict with 
the IIRIRA, see infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. 
157.  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1996 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting section and 
subsection titles using word “voluntary”). 
158.  See id. (noting statutory instructions for Secretary of Homeland Security). 
159.  For a further discussion on why the state law creates an obstacle to legislative 
purpose, see infra notes 160–73. 
160.  See, e.g., Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991); Etuk 
v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433, 1437 (2d Cir. 1991); Steiben v. INS, 932 F.2d 1225, 1228 (8th Cir. 
1991); Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 
853, 864 n.6 (5th Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Tortilleria “La Mejor”, 758 F. Supp. 585, 591 (E.D. 
Cal. 1991); United States v. Moreno-Duque, 718 F. Supp. 254, 259 (D. Vt. 1989). 
161.  See, e.g., Etuk, 936 F.3d at 1437 (concluding that purpose of IRCA’s employment 
provisions was to stem illegal immigration by making employment difficult to obtain); 
Steiben, 932 F.2d at 1228 (same); Nat’l Ctr., 913 F.2d at 1367 (same); Quality Inn, 846 F.2d 
at 704 (same); Jackson, 825 F.2d at 864 n.6 (same); Tortilleria, 758 F. Supp. at 591 (same).  
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second, minimizing burdens on employers;162 third, preserving legal 
immigration by minimizing illegal immigration;163 fourth, imposing 
misdemeanor criminal liability for employing unauthorized workers.164 
Former Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano (now Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security), who signed the Arizona law at issue in 
Whiting, stated that she viewed Congress as incapable of providing what she 
believed was necessary immigration reform, and because she hoped to reduce 
“the flow of illegal immigration into Arizona,” by reducing or eliminating the 
availability of employment.165  Thus, the Arizona law was intended to further 
only the first IRCA goal—stemming illegal immigration—without protecting 
the other goals, because it was meant to supplant dissatisfactory federal 
legislation and enforcement.166  Therefore, the Arizona law has the effect of 
altering the “delicate balance of statutory objectives” struck by IRCA.167 
The Arizona law also explicitly undermines congressional intent regarding 
E-Verify because it mandated that which Congress explicitly made 
voluntary.168  The Court relied on an Executive Order by President George W. 
 
162.  See, e.g., Collins Foods, 948 F.2d at 554 (holding that legislative history shows 
congressional intent to minimize burden on employers).  Part of the balance Congress struck 
was to achieve its goals in a way that was the least burdensome to employers.  See id.  In other 
words, Congress was not seeking to eliminate illegal immigration without consideration of 
such burdens.  See id.  In doing so, Congress chose the I-9 method of employment 
authorization verification.  See id. 
163.  See, e.g., Steiben, 932 F.2d at 1228 (noting congressional intent to limit illegal 
immigration in order to preserve legal immigration).  The idea is that the door to legal 
immigration cannot be kept open if illegal immigration cannot be minimized.  See id. 
164.  See, e.g., Moreno-Duque, 718 F. Supp. at 259 (finding that Congress intended to 
create misdemeanor criminal liability for employers who knowingly hired unauthorized 
workers). 
165.  See Penny Starr, Supreme Court Hears Challenge to Arizona Immigration Law—
The One Signed by Gov. Janet Napolitano, CNSNEWS (Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/supreme-court-hears-challenge-arizona-immigration-law-
one-signed-gov-janet-napolitano.  At the time the Court heard Whiting, Napolitano had 
become Secretary of DHS and, thus, was no longer Governor of Arizona.  See id.  Governor 
Jan Brewer, who attended the Whiting hearings, was Napolitano’s successor.  See id. 
166.  See id. (quoting Napolitano’s explanation of reasons for Arizona law). 
167.  Cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (finding 
state law must be pre-empted to avoid skewing balance struck by federal law).  The Arizona 
law in Whiting impaired several federal objectives because it targeted employment as a means 
to reduce illegal immigration.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1988 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  First, mandatory use of E-Verify and harsh licensing sanctions 
increase, rather than minimize, the burden on employers.  See id. at 1992.  Second, although 
illegal immigration is the Arizona law’s primary target, it may have an impact on legal 
immigration, including the potential for racial discrimination and the inaccuracy of E-Verify 
results.  See id. at 1990.  Finally, although the Arizona law does not affect criminal liability, it 
does supplement the congressionally chosen consequences for IRCA violations.  See id. at 
2004 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
168.  See id. at 1997 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s conclusion 
that Arizona’s E-Verify mandate is not in conflict with federal law).  Justice Breyer declared 
that “[t]here is no reason to imply negatively from language telling the Secretary not to make 
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Bush mandating use of E-Verify for federal contractors, and the President’s 
contemporaneous statement of belief in the Arizona law’s validity, as evidence 
that the Arizona law did not undermine congressional intent.169  The Court also 
relied on DHS’s opinion that E-Verify could sustain existing state E-Verify 
mandates.170 
The weak probative value of considering the statutory interpretation of 
anyone other than Congress to establish congressional intent is further 
weakened by the strong negative reaction and legal challenges to the Executive 
Order, and the fact that the President’s statement of support for the Arizona law 
was made in the context of these challenges.171  Additionally, the Court’s 
reference to Congress’s purposes for creating E-Verify does not shed much light 
on its decision to make it voluntary.172  Finally, the Court’s reliance on DHS 
was misplaced because DHS is not a competent source for questions regarding 
the federal budget.173 
 
IV. AFTER WHITING 
 
Whiting is unlikely to be an isolated case with limited impact.174  The 
Whiting decision has spurred additional litigation and will undeniably impact 
 
the program mandatory, permission for the States to do so.  There is no presumption that a 
State may modify the operation of a uniquely federal program like E–Verify.”  Id. 
169.  See id. at 1985 (majority opinion) (relying on Executive Order 13465 and 
contemporaneous statements as support for constitutionality of Arizona law). 
170.  See id. at 1986 (discussing statement made by DHS). 
171.  Cf. id. at 1997 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that legitimacy of Executive Order 
itself has not been determined). 
172.  See id. at 1986 (majority opinion) (noting Congress’s purposes for “authorizing 
the development of E-Verify”).  Regardless of Congress’s motivation for creating E-Verify, 
those purposes did not address E-Verify’s status as a voluntary pilot program and that 
Congress has never expanded the scope of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s authority to 
mandate its use.  See id. at 1996 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The Court did not address why 
Congress would limit the Secretary of Homeland Security’s ability to mandate use of E-
Verify, but leave the states the power to do so.  Arguably, if Congress took no issue with 
mandatory nationwide use of E-Verify, it would not have limited the Secretary’s authority to 
make E-Verify mandatory.  See id. at 1996–97. 
173.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”); see also Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 2006–07 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (asserting that opinion of DHS carries little weight because 
Congress essentially holds power to balance budget).  As Justice Sotomayor points out in 
Whiting dissent, “[i]t matters not whether the Executive Branch believes that the Government 
is now capable of handling the burdens of a mandatory system.  Congressional intent controls, 
and Congress has repeatedly decided to keep the E-Verify program voluntary.”  Whiting, 131 
S. Ct. at 2007 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).  
174.  See generally Daniel B. Wood, After Arizona, Why Are 10 States Considering 
Immigration Bills?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2010/0510/After-Arizona-why-are-10-states-
considering-immigration-bills (noting significant increase in state immigration laws in recent 
years). 
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any pending litigation on similar issues.175  This is especially true because the 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Whiting’s approach to analyzing state 
immigration laws.176  Also, Whiting created several practical concerns about 
similar proposed or enacted state laws.177 
 
A. Other Cases Involving State Immigration Laws 
 
1. United States v. Arizona178 
 
Arizona has enacted other state immigration laws in addition to the one 
considered in Whiting, most notably the Support Our Law Enforcement and 
Safe Neighborhoods Act (“S.B. 1070”).179  S.B. 1070 created state offenses for 
immigration law violations and required police officers who suspect that a 
person is in unlawful immigration status to stop, detain, or arrest them in order 
to verify their immigration status with the federal government.180  The United 
States challenged the state law on pre-emption grounds in the District of 
Arizona, which granted a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of 
several provisions of S.B. 1070.181  Both parties appealed and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.182 
Recently, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Arizona v. United 
States.183  Somewhat surprisingly, the Court found S.B. 1070 largely pre-
empted.184  It did so by largely ignoring Whiting and, to the extent that it did 
acknowledge Whiting, the Court distinguished that case by framing it as a case 
 
175.  See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (challenging 
Arizona state law as pre-empted by Immigration and Nationality Act); Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011) (challenging city 
ordinance that regulated rental of houses to certain aliens).  For a further discussion of 
litigation impacted by Whiting, see infra notes 179–92 and accompanying text. 
176.  See Hazleton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958, 2958 (2011) (vacating and remanding to 
Third Circuit for reconsideration in light of Whiting). 
177.  See generally Barrowclough, supra note 22, at 805–16 (discussing various 
shortcomings of E-Verify).  Arizona has paved the way for other state laws that go even 
further.  See Wood, supra note 174 (discussing other states that have proposed or enacted 
immigration laws after Arizona); see also  NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5 
(discussing adverse consequences of state immigration laws). 
178.  (Arizona I), 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part, aff’d in part by Arizona v. 
United States, (Arizona II), 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
179.  See id. at 343–44 (outlining Arizona law S.B. 1070); Arizona II, 132 S. Ct. at 
2497–98 (outlining S.B. 1070). 
180.  See Arizona I, 641 F.3d at 343–44 (“S.B. 1070 establishes a variety of 
immigration-related state offenses and defines the immigration enforcement authority of 
Arizona’s state and local law enforcement officers.”). 
181.  See id. at 344  (explaining procedural history of case and noting grant of 
preliminary injunction). 
182.  See id. (stating grounds for appeal and affirmation of lower court’s decision). 
183.  See Arizona II, 132 S. Ct. at 2492 (considering appeal from Ninth Circuit). 
184.  See id. at 2510 (holding sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of S.B. 1070 pre-empted). 
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about express pre-emption.185  The Court upheld, on its face, but not as applied, 
the provision of S.B. 1070 requiring police officers to ascertain the immigration 
status of individuals whom they suspect to be in unlawful immigration status, 
which requires cooperation with the federal government pursuant to “the same 
verification provision utilized in the law upheld in Whiting.”186 
 
2. Lozano v. Hazleton 
 
Lozano v. Hazleton187 involved a challenge to local ordinances in 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania that criminalized the employment and housing of 
undocumented aliens and imposed various sanctions upon employers, landlords, 
and others who violated the ordinances.188  The district court found the local 
ordinances pre-empted by federal law and issued a permanent injunction against 
their enforcement.189  On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in large part.190  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Third 
Circuit, and remanded for reconsideration based on its decision in Whiting.191  
It is possible that the outcome of this case will be completely altered in light of 
Whiting.192 
 
B. Other Recently Passed or Proposed State Laws 
 
The implications of Whiting are not confined to pre-existing litigation of 
the state immigration laws discussed here, rather other states are continuing to 
 
185.  See id. at 2500–01 ( “There is no doubt that Congress may withdraw specified 
powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision.” 
(citing Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974–75 (2011))). 
186.  Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 11, Arizona II, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 
2012 WL 1332574, at *11; see also Arizona II, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 (“The Federal Government 
has brought suit against a sovereign State to challenge the provision even before the law has 
gone into effect.  There is a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be 
enforced.  At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, 
it would be inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed in a way that creates a conflict 
with federal law.”). 
187.  620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
188.  See id. at 176–81 (explaining local ordinances and factual and historical 
background). 
189.  See id. at 181 (summarizing procedural background). 
190.  See id. at 183 (discussing standing and finding that no plaintiff had standing to 
challenge private cause of action).  The Court of Appeals reversed only the portion of the 
lower court’s decision that invalidated the ordinance’s creation of a private cause of action.  
See id.  The court reversed based on lack of standing, rather than on the merits.  See id. at 
183–92. 
191.  See Hazleton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958, 2958 (2011) (vacating and remanding to 
Third Circuit). 
192.  See id. (vacating and remanding to Third Circuit).  It is likely that “further 
consideration in light of Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting” will 
yield a result similar to Whiting.  See id. 
27
Ploeg: Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: A Law Student's Freewheeling Inqu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW ONLINE: TOLLE LEGE CITE: 58 VILL. LAW REV. TOLLE LEGE 26 (2013) 
2013] A LAW STUDENT’S FREEWHEELING INQUIRY 53	  
 
enact similar laws and litigation is increasing.193  These state laws touch on 
employment, housing, and other areas.194  Despite the fact that the Supreme 
Court has now decided two federal pre-emption cases in the area of immigration 
law within the past two years, lower courts are still split on many related pre-
emption issues.195 
 
C. Problems with State Enforcement of Immigration Law 
 
1. Unqualified Officials 
 
Immigration law is a complicated body of law that has profound 
significance for those whose lives it touches.196  In order to properly enforce 
immigration law, state and local police need extensive training, which requires 
increased funding.197  Additionally, the current method of adjudication 
designated by Congress provides that judges familiar with immigration law will 
 
193.  See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(holding various Alabama law provisions relating to aliens were pre-empted because 
provision requiring police to investigate immigration status of detained aliens suspected of 
being in unlawful immigration status was not pre-empted); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City 
of Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d 802, 809 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding city ordinance requiring rental 
tenants to obtain a special permit contingent on lawful immigration status pre-empted by 
federal law), reh’g en banc granted, 688 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012); Keller v. City of Fremont, 
853 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Neb. 2012) (holding city ordinances requiring employer use of E-
Verify, prohibiting leasing of housing to “illegal aliens,” and requiring tenants to obtain 
special license were not pre-empted by federal law); Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 
F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1179 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (holding state law criminalizing business 
transactions between undocumented aliens and state pre-empted by federal law); see also 
Susan Guyett, Judge Blocks Part of Indiana Immigration Law, REUTERS (June 24, 2011, 
11:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/25/us-indiana-immigration-
idUSTRE75O09R20110625 (discussing injunction issued to enjoin part of Indiana law); 
NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5, at 17–30 (discussing potential state legislation 
and its possible implications); Wood, supra note 174 (discussing enjoinder of Alabama law). 
194.  For a further discussion of the various state immigration laws that have been 
recently enacted, see supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
195.  For a further discussion of state immigration laws and lower court decisions, see 
supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
196.  See LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENFORCING 
IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 (2009) 
(explaining arguments regarding necessary training of local police to enforce immigration 
law).  The report neutrally explains that immigration law is a “complex body of law,” which 
“requires extensive training and expertise to adequately enforce.”  Id. at 22.  The report then 
explains two opposing views, one emphasizing the extensiveness of the necessary training, 
and the other which confidently asserts that state and local police are capable of learning the 
necessary information through currently available training programs.  Id. at 22–23. 
197.  See id. (discussing arguments regarding resources required for state and local 
enforcement).  Both opponents and proponents of state and local enforcement of immigration 
law acknowledge that it would require resources to fund, although they disagree about how 
those resources might be obtained.  See id.  There is, however, a possibility that significant 
state and local resources would need to be diverted for funding of such training.  See NAT’L 
IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5, at 12–13 (summarizing predictions of costs to enforce 
S.B. 1070 made by one Arizona county). 
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hear charges of IRCA violations.198  State courts, by contrast, are generally 
inexperienced with federal issues such as immigration law.199  Thus, state laws 
like the Arizona law in Whiting, will place some of the most important issues of 
noncitizens’ lives in the control of those unknowledgeable about such issues.200 
 
2. Negative Effects for State and Local Police 
 
Several recently passed or proposed state laws, including Arizona 
legislation not at issue in Whiting, require noncitizens to carry immigration 
documentation with them at all times and give state and local police broad 
power to arrest and detain individuals suspected of being in the country 
illegally.201  Many, including police officers, have voiced concern that these 
laws will undermine public safety.202  Threats to public safety may result from 
noncitizens’ reluctance to cooperate in police investigations or to report crimes, 
and from diverting resources away from public safety initiatives.203 
 
3. E-Verify’s Limitations 
 
Recent state laws that mandate use of E-Verify, like the Arizona law in 
Whiting, raise other concerns.204  The program’s reliability is highly 
 
198.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 2001 (2011) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (“Congress ensured that administrative orders finding violations of IRCA 
would be reviewed by federal judges with experience adjudicating immigration-related 
matters.”)  Justice Sotomayor considered it significant that Congress established procedures 
for federal adjudication of violations of IRCA’s employment authorization verification 
procedures.  See id. 
199.  See id. at 2003 (noting state courts are “inexperienced in immigration matters”). 
200.  See generally id.  For a further discussion on the lack of qualified state officials 
that could potentially hear immigration matters, see supra notes 196–199 and accompanying 
text. 
201.  See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5, at 8 (discussing Arizona’s 
“Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” also known as S.B. 1070). 
202.  See ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A 
BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 23–24 (2009) 
(discussing potential for threat to public safety as result of local enforcement); see also NAT’L 
IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5, at 15 (discussing threats to public safety from local 
police enforcement of immigration law); SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 196, at 24 
(summarizing debate about effects on public safety).  “Further, law enforcement officials—
charged with public safety—argue that the law diverts precious resources from their ability to 
protect against dangerous criminals and violent crime . . . .”  NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, 
supra note 5, at 15. 
203.  See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5, at 15 (discussing source of 
threats to public safety).  The article quotes the Tucson, Arizona Police Chief expressing 
concern that S.B. 1070 will make immigration enforcement a higher priority than other 
important police concerns, and further strain limited law enforcement budgets.  See id.  The 
article also discussed the potential for creating distrust of police within communities if police 
are viewed as immigration officers.  See id. 
204.  For a further discussion on the limitations of E-Verify, see infra notes 205–07 and 
accompanying text. 
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contested.205  Also, mandatory use of E-Verify seriously burdens both 
employers and employees; for example, employers must maintain access to 
computers and the Internet and employees shoulder the burden of challenging 
tentative non-confirmations.206  Moreover, E-Verify’s exclusive use of social 
security numbers for employment authorization verification could easily result 
in an increase in identity fraud.207 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Whiting departs from the Supreme Court’s traditional application of 
implied pre-emption and general pre-emption principles, which are well 
established and have been repeatedly applied over many years.208  The Court 
used implied pre-emption principles only a few years ago to strike down a state 
law with a similar relationship to federal law as the laws in Whiting.209  The 
Whiting Court should have found the Arizona law pre-empted by federal law 
 
205.  See Barrowclough, supra note 22, at 810–13 (discussing accuracy and due process 
difficulties presented by E-Verify).  Despite the Whiting Court’s confidence in E-Verify, 
several studies have shown significant rates of inaccuracy.  See id.  Justice Breyer, dissenting 
in Whiting, also cited studies showing high inaccuracy rates and expressed concern that 
noncitizens would have an even higher risk of inaccurate work authorization verification 
results because of name inconsistencies caused by misspellings of foreign names, as well as 
other factors.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1996 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  For example, in Mexican and other Hispanic cultures, every person has two 
surnames.  See Manuel A. Perez-Quinones, Hispanic Last Names: Why Two of Them?, 
http://perez.cs.vt.edu/twolastnames (last updated Mar. 2002) (explaining Hispanics’ use of 
two last names).  However, confusion frequently arises when people assume that one of the 
surnames is a middle name, or the first surname can be eliminated and Hispanic persons 
having two surnames can be listed only by their second surname.  See id.  However, if a 
Hispanic name must be shortened, it would make more sense to eliminate the second surname 
instead of the first, as the first surname is paternal and the second is maternal.  See id. 
(explaining source of each last name and suggesting ways to minimize confusion and 
inconsistency).  
206.  See Barrowclough, supra note 22, at 809, 812–13 (discussing burdens on 
employers and employees created by mandating use of E-Verify).  If E-Verify were mandated 
nationwide then all employers would have to maintain access to a computer and Internet 
connection, even if they had no other use or need for them.  See id.  Also, employees must 
shoulder the burden of challenging a tentative non-confirmation, which requires the noncitizen 
to read—or have translated—documents into English, and travel within eight days to a Social 
Security Administration or USCIS office during business hours.  See id.  This process 
describes only the minimum that employees must do in response to a tentative non-
confirmation, assuming no other complications.  See id. 
207.  See Barrowclough, supra note 22, at 813–14 (discussing potential for identity 
fraud with E-Verify).  Ironically, the I-9 system is less likely to result in identity fraud because 
it requires employers to review documents that establish identity and work authorization.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(D) (2006). 
208.  For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s application of general pre-emption and 
implied pre-emption principles, see supra, notes 74–131 and accompanying text.  
209.  See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (holding state tort 
law pre-empted). 
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because it undermines several federal objectives.210  Moreover, Whiting could 
create serious practical problems and has already begun to do so, as more state 
immigration laws are proposed and passed.211  It is time to return an 
exclusively federal power to the federal government and tear down the façade 
of state laws purporting to regulate employment, housing, and the like, while 
essentially regulating immigration.212  Dissatisfaction with federal law must be 
addressed at the federal level.213 
 
 
210.  See, e.g., Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]he legislative history of section 1324a indicates that Congress intended to minimize the 
burden and the risk placed on the employer in the verification process.”); Etuk v. Slattery, 936 
F.2d 1433, 1437 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting Congress’s goal of precluding employment of aliens 
lacking either LPR status or special employment authorization from Attorney General); 
Steiben v. INS, 932 F.2d 1225, 1228 (8th Cir. 1991) (“This legislation seeks to close the back 
door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigration may remain open.”); 
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting 
Congress’s objective to control alien employment “through employer not employee 
sanctions . . . .”); Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[N]othing in 
the IRCA or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to limit the rights of 
undocumented aliens under the FLSA.”); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 864 n.6 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (noting purpose of IRCA to “lessen the volume” of undocumented aliens in United 
States by “removing much of the economic benefit associated with coming to the United 
States illegally”); EEOC v. Tortilleria “La Mejor”, 758 F. Supp. 585, 591 (E.D. Cal. 1991) 
(“Congress enacted the IRCA to reduce illegal immigration by eliminating employers’ 
economic incentive to hire undocumented aliens.”); United States v. Moreno-Duque, 718 F. 
Supp. 254, 259 (D. Vt. 1989) (emphasizing Congress’s intent to criminalize employment of 
unauthorized aliens through employers rather than employees in transportation context). 
211.  See Barrowclough, supra note 22, at 805–14 (discussing negative effects of E-
Verify mandates including potential employer abuse and inaccuracy); see also NAT’L 
IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5 (discussing proposed or discussed state immigration laws 
and serious consequences). 
212.  For a further discussion on why the federal government and not state governments 
should regulate immigration, see supra notes 1–207 and accompanying text.  
213.  For a further discussion on why the federal government, and not state 
governments, should regulate immigration, see supra notes 1–207 and accompanying text.   
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